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I. THE CONCEPT 
 
 
egal advisers are supposed to be made available to military commanders, 
particularly during hostilities, as a product of AP/I (Protocol I of 1977 Ad-
ditional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949). Article 82 of AP/I proclaims: 
 
The High Contracting Parties at all times, and the Parties to the conflict in 
time of armed conflict, shall ensure that legal advisers are available, when 
necessary, to advise military commanders at the appropriate level on the 
application of the Conventions and this Protocol and on the appropriate 
instruction to be given to the armed forces on this subject.1 
 
This treaty stipulation was quite innovative in 1977,2 but it has definitely 
caught on thenceforth. Needless to say, all Contracting Parties to AP/I are 
bound to comply with Article 82 (unless an explicit reservation has been 
recorded at the time of ratification or accession3). But even as far as non-
Contracting Parties are concerned, it is noteworthy that the United States—
which thoroughly objects to numerous provisions of AP/I—by no means 
dissents from Article 82. Indeed, the US Department of Defense Law of War 
Manual (citing Article 82) attests that qualified legal advisers are made avail-
able at all levels of command to provide advice about law of war compliance 
during planning and execution of operations.4 
A study of the practice of States, made by the ICRC (International Com-
mittee of the Red Cross), confirms that the norm requiring that legal advisers 
be made available to advise military commanders in time of armed conflict 
currently reflects customary international law.5 The prevalence of germane 
 
1. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to 
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 82, June 8, 1977, 1125 
U.N.T.S. 3, 41 [hereinafter AP/I]. 
2. See K.J. Partsch, Article 82, in NEW RULES FOR VICTIMS OF ARMED CONFLICTS: COM-
MENTARY ON THE TWO 1977 PROTOCOLS ADDITIONAL TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS 
OF 1949, at 564 (Michael Bothe et al. eds., 1982). 
3. There are a host of reservations to AP/I. See THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS: A 
COLLECTION OF CONVENTIONS, RESOLUTIONS AND OTHER DOCUMENTS 792 (Dietrich 
Schindler & Jiri Toman eds., 4th ed. 2004). However, none of them deflects from Article 
82. 
4. OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, LAW OF 
WAR MANUAL § 18.5.1 (rev. ed. Dec. 2016) [hereinafter U.S. DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL]. 
5. See 1 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 500 (Jean-Marie Hencka-













States’ practice cannot be gainsaid, although some critics maintain that it is 
uncertain whether non-Contracting Parties act the way they do because they 
feel that they are bound by a customary legal obligation or simply “as a mat-
ter of operational practicality.”6 
The language of Article 82 is somewhat unusual. As the ICRC Commen-
tary on AP/I stresses, the clause combines a clear-cut obligation (immanent 
in the phrase “shall ensure”) with a certain degree of flexibility (derived from 
the unspecified reference to “the appropriate level” and the qualifying words 
“when necessary”).7 
 
II. APPLICATION IN PRACTICE 
 
A. The Appropriate Level of Command 
 
Each State is empowered to determine the appropriate level of military com-
mand to which it is necessary to make legal advisers available.8 In the past, 
the operational level considered most suitable in land warfare seemed to have 
been, in the main, the headquarters of a division or a larger unit.9 But there 
is a growing tendency to post legal advisers to brigades,10 and even to smaller 
military formations acting independently.11 In air and maritime campaigns, 
legal advisers will commonly be assigned to central (theater) commands. 
Plainly, an attachment of legal advisers to lower levels of command can 
prove to be unfeasible to the point of incongruity.12 A legal adviser cannot 
 
6. David Turns, Implementation and Compliance, in PERSPECTIVES ON THE ICRC STUDY 
ON CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 354, 362 (Elizabeth Wilmshurst & 
Susan Breau eds., 2007). 
7. Jean de Preux, Article 82, in COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 
JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, at 947, 949 (Yves Sandoz 
et al. eds., 1987). 
8. See Leslie C. Green, The Role of Legal Advisers in the Armed Forces, 7 ISRAEL YEARBOOK 
ON HUMAN RIGHTS 154, 163 (1977). 
9. See Günther Moritz, Legal Advisers in Armed Forces: Position and Functions, 21 MILITARY 
LAW AND LAW OF WAR REVIEW 483, 486 (1982). 
10. See Amendment 7 of 2013 to page 413 of the original 2004 UK Manual. UNITED 
KINGDOM MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, THE MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 413 
n.16 (2004). 
11. See J.F.R. Boddens Hosang, International Humanitarian Law, Self-Defence and Rules of 
Engagement: Application in the Netherlands, 48 COLLEGIUM 172, 174 n.5 (2018). 
12. See Michael C. Denny, The Impact of Article 82 of Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions 












be ensconced in the turret of a tank, in the cockpit of a jet fighter, or on the 
deck of a missile boat. That said, the efficacy of modern digital communica-
tions (including e-mails) is such that apposite legal advice can be relayed from 
headquarters to subordinate units with scarcely any time-lag.13 
In the 1945 war crimes trial of The Peleus, a British judge advocate fa-
mously said: “It is quite obvious that no sailor and no soldier can carry with 
him a library of international law, or have immediate access to a professor in 
that subject who can tell him whether or not a particular command is a lawful 
one.”14 
The passage relates, of course, to obedience to orders rather than to ac-
tions taken by commanders. Leaving that aside, the availability of profes-
sional legal advisers to assist military commanders is devised to surmount 
the obstacle adverted to by the judge advocate. Lawyers, too, may admittedly 
be in want of a library of international law or a specialist’s opinion. But that 
should only marginally handicap them. If a problem strays outside the area 
of expertise of legal advisers, they ought to be able to tap bibliographical 
resources—as well as benefit from the feedback of colleagues and superi-
ors—by transmitting and receiving messages electronically.  
 
B. The Role of the Legal Adviser in General 
 
Whatever the operational layer to which legal advisers are seconded, their 
duty is to advise military commanders. Article 82 refers to advice on (i) the 
application of the Geneva Conventions and AP/I, as well as (ii) their instruc-
tion. “In practice, legal advice to the armed forces is not limited to the Ge-
neva Conventions and AP I but encompasses the whole range of public in-
ternational law linked to international humanitarian law (IHL) and the law 
of armed conflicts.”15 In other words, the broadest gamut of LOAC (law of 
armed conflict) is within the ambit of the interaction between military com-
manders and their legal advisers. 
 
13. See WILLIAM H. BOOTHBY, THE LAW OF TARGETING 484 (2012). 
14. The Peleus Trial [1945] (British Military Court for the Trial of War Criminals, Ham-
burg, 1945), reported in UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION, 1 LAW REPORTS OF 
TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 1, 12 (1947). 
15. Maiki Kuhn & Antje C. Berger, Legal Advisers in the Armed Forces, in THE ROLE OF 












Naturally, the appointment of legal advisers to field tasks is a means ra-
ther than an end in itself. Legal advisers are made available to military com-
manders for a purpose. It is pointless to deploy legal advisers to assist mili-
tary commanders unless the military commanders in effect consult them 
when LOAC issues arise.16 For their part, legal advisers have to be prepared 
to caution military commanders against anticipated actions that are incom-
patible with LOAC, outlining alternative options.17 Moreover, “[t]he idea 
that advice is given only when sought must be discarded.”18 Legal advisers 
are expected to offer professional advice “even proprio motu.”19 To be able to 
do that, legal advisers incontestably need access to the military commanders 
themselves and to the information that is crucial for the discharge of their 
duties.20  
As a rule, legal advisers have sufficient rank and experience to be able to 
stand up to the challenge of contributing to the planning and execution of 
military operations in a skillful manner that invites esteem.21 But, since the 
thinking of legal advisers may not correspond with the ingrained inclinations 
of military commanders, legal advisers (albeit normally embedded in the 
armed forces, rather than serving as civilians22) have to be somewhat de-
tached from the straight chain of command.23 Correspondingly, the German 
Law of Armed Conflict Manual spells out that “military superiors are only au-
thorized to direct legal advisers in administrative matters, not in the assess-
ment of legal matters.”24  
Be their professional counsel as it may, legal advisers acting pursuant to 
Article 82 are there to advise military commanders and “not to replace 
 
16. See G.I.A.D. Draper, Role of Legal Advisers in Armed Forces, 202 INTERNATIONAL 
REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 6, 15 (1978). 
17. See A.P.V. ROGERS, LAW ON THE BATTLEFIELD 370 (3d ed. 2012). 
18. G.I.A.D. Draper, Intervention, 21 MILITARY LAW AND LAW OF WAR REVIEW 515, 
517 (1982).  
19. See de Preux, supra note 7, at 953. 
20. See UNITED KINGDOM MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, LEGAL SUPPORT TO JOINT OPER-
ATIONS 83 (3d ed. 2018). 
21. See Levator Norsworthy Jr., Organization for Battle: The Judge Advocate’s Responsibility 
under Article 82 of Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, 93 MILITARY LAW REVIEW 9, 18 (1981). 
22. See Michael L. Kramer & Michael N. Schmitt, Lawyers on Horseback? Thoughts on Judge 
Advocates and Civil-Military Relations, 55 UCLA LAW REVIEW 1407, 1426 (2008). 
23. See Christopher Greenwood, Historical Development and Legal Basis, in THE HAND-
BOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 1, 43 (Dieter Fleck ed., 2d ed. 2008). 
24. FEDERAL MINISTRY OF DEFENCE (GERMANY), ZDV 15/2, LAW OF ARMED CON-











them.”25 Differently put, the role of a legal adviser is “confined to advice 
only” and not to the implementation of that advice.26 At the end of the day, 
the decision-making is left squarely in the hands of the military commander. 
  
C. The Exception: Legal Advisers with De Facto Veto Power 
 
There is a notable exception to the rule concerning the purely advisory char-
acter of the legal counsel submitted to military commanders, and that is Is-
rael. IDF (Israel Defense Forces) legal advisers are functioning within a 
MAG (Military Advocate General) Corps. Appointed directly by the Minister 
of Defense, the MAG—who serves on the IDF General Staff—acts inde-
pendently of the Chief of Staff insofar as legal matters are concerned. The 
MAG is “subject to no authority but the law” and is “guided only by Israel’s 
Attorney General.”27 Furthermore, the MAG’s professional independence 
“extends to every subordinate military attorney serving as an officer within 
the MAG Corps.”28  
In theory, as asseverated by a former Israeli MAG, “the final decision on 
all matters” even in Israel is that the military commander “can accept or re-
ject the legal advice tendered.”29 Yet, when all is said and done, once a legal 
opinion endorsed by the MAG is rendered, Israeli military commanders 
“have no option but to follow the advice of their lawyers.”30 In consequence, 
when acting under the personal aegis of the MAG, Israeli legal advisers have 
gained “a certain de facto veto power” vis-à-vis military commanders.31  
The de facto veto phenomenon is quite unique. Israel is not a Contract-
ing Party to AP/I, so there is no need to reconcile its practice with Article 
 
25. Jean de Preux, Article 87, in COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra 
note 7, at 1017, 1021. 
26. Dov Shefi, The Status of the Legal Adviser to the Armed Forces: His Functions and Powers, 
100 MILITARY LAW REVIEW 119, 128 (1983). 
27. See Report Published under the Auspices of Government of Israel, The 2014 Gaza 
Conflict (“Operation Protective Edge”): Factual and Legal Aspects, 45 ISRAEL YEARBOOK ON HU-
MAN RIGHTS 237, 406 (2015) [hereinafter The 2014 Gaza Conflict]. 
28. Id. at 406–7. 
29. Dov Shefi, Intervention: The Status of the Legal Adviser to the Armed Forces – His Functions 
and Powers, 21 MILITARY LAW AND LAW OF WAR REVIEW 507, 508 (1982). 
30. See Michael N. Schmitt & John J. Merriam, The Tyranny of Context: Israeli Targeting 
Practices in Legal Perspective, 37 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 53, 86–87 (2015). 
31. Amichai Cohen, Legal Operational Advice in the Israeli Defense Forces: The International 
Law Department and the Changing Nature of International Humanitarian Law, 26 CONNECTICUT 











82. However, even if inspected through the lens of Article 82, it is impossible 
to deny the prerogative of a State to rein in its military commanders and to 
tip the scale in the balance of authority in favor of legal advisers.  
 
III. ALLEGED DEMERITS OF THE SYSTEM  
 
A. Infringement of the Military Commander’s Freedom of Action? 
 
Curiously, it was in Israel that serious doubt has been cast on the very con-
cept of posting legal advisers to advise military commanders during combat. 
This came about in a report of a Public Commission of Inquiry set up by the 
government—with retired Justice E. Winograd in the Chair—in order to in-
vestigate all the dimensions of the 2006 hostilities with Hezbollah (known in 
Israel as the Second Lebanon War). Chapter 14 of the final Winograd Re-
port, published in 2008, was devoted to diverse aspects of international law; 
and it addressed at some length the specific topic of legal advisers made 
available to military commanders.32  
The Winograd Report registered that—in the course of the 2006 
fighting—representatives of the MAG dispensed legal advice in real time at 
the Headquarters of the IDF Northern Command, and in some instances 
also in subordinate units.33 Without mentioning Article 82 of AP/I, the Re-
port alluded to the similarity of the Israeli practice to that prevalent in other 
Western armed forces and remarked that many benefits can be derived from 
it.34 Even so, the Report queried whether the practice is desirable, since in 
the jaundiced view of the Commission (i) LOAC norms are often unclear 
and equivocal35 and (ii) overreliance on legal advice in the midst of hostilities 
is liable to divert responsibility from military commanders to their legal ad-
visers and to disrupt operational activities.36  
The Winograd Commission concluded that, on the whole, it would be 
better for military commanders in the field to concentrate on combat rather 
than spend crucial time in consulting with legal advisers.37 The Commission 
 
32. 1 FINAL REPORT OF THE WINOGRAD COMMISSION 481 (2008) (in Hebrew). An 
unofficial English translation of most of chapter 14 appears in 2 HOW DOES LAW PROTECT 
IN WAR? 1276 (Marco Sassòli et al. eds., 3d ed. 2011). (References below will be made to 
the paragraph numbers to enable following all the key points in the English translation.) 
33. Id. ¶ 26. 
34. Id. ¶ 27. 
35. Id. ¶ 21. 
36. Id. ¶ 29. 











preferred a policy of (i) instilling in combatants the legal norms of conduct 
prior to action; (ii) reviewing the action afterwards, inter alia, in the context 
of incurring responsibility when legal norms are flagrantly breached; yet (iii) 
vesting decision-makers with freedom of action when fighting is ongoing.38  
The Winograd Commission’s approach purported to safeguard military 
commanders from any distraction in the heat of battle. However, on top of 
colliding head-on with lessons learned in wide-ranging experience accumu-
lated since the adoption of Article 82, the Report overlooked the level of the 
military command to which legal advisers are designated. After all, it has 
never been contemplated that commanders of small units under fire should 
take time out to consult lawyers about critical decisions that may have to be 
cemented in split seconds. Legal advisers are present at some relative dis-
tance from the front line, epitomized by the headquarters of a division or a 
brigade (the usual levels benchmarking their assignment). In these surround-
ings, the pace of events—despite its intensity—allows some pause for reflec-
tion. Staff discussions are routinely held, in both the planning and execution 
phases of operations, and teamwork is taken for granted. Is it logical that, of 
all potential dialogues, only consultations with legal advisers are to be ex-
cluded? When all pertinent data (encompassing the choice of means and 
methods of warfare, the interpretation of intelligence, the allocation and co-
ordination of resources, etc.) are synthesized at headquarters, input by legal 
advisers would be conspicuous by its absence. 
The Winograd Commission was confident that, by eliminating from the 
equation time-consuming discourses with legal advisers, it was shielding the 
interests of military commanders who would thereby retain their full discre-
tion in combat. But the Report is afflicted by a paradox. On the one hand, 
the Commission noted that the initiative for legal advice during the 2006 
hostilities frequently originated from the military units engaged.39 It even 
brought to the fore the apprehension that military commanders’ concern 
about possible criminal prosecution for LOAC breaches might paralyze 
them, thus detrimentally affecting operational missions.40 On the other hand, 
the Commission rejected legal advisers as an antidote for that potential pa-
ralysis.  
It is counter-intuitive to believe that military commanders would choose 
to face the odium of protracted future prosecutions, liable to taint their rep-
utation and harm their careers, rather than briefly pause for consultations 
 
38. Id. ¶ 30. 
39. Id. ¶ 26. 











with legal advisers. The Winograd Commission was simply off the mark in 
striving to reverse the relentless global tide that enables military commanders 
to obtain counsel from legal advisers at present, in order to stave off the risk 
of going through a future via dolorosa of showing just cause for their actions. 
 
B. Legal Advisers in a Bind? 
 
One argument brought up in the Winograd Report deserves particular heed. 
The Commission propounded that it would be preferable for the legal advice 
echelon not to place itself in a situation where it might be precluded from 
rendering professional post factum opinion, inasmuch as it has already sanc-
tioned the action when in progress.41  
This last assertion is cogent in the Israeli context, taking into account 
that the legal adviser (if backed by the MAG) functions virtually as a full-
fledged participant in the decision-making process of the military command. 
While there is no personal union between the individual legal adviser and 
any post-op investigator, it must be underscored that the MAG is entrusted 
with the ultimate review authority of all complaints concerning IDF miscon-
duct.42 If the MAG is brought into the loop at the outset—and gives a per-
sonal stamp of approval to certain measures resorted to during combat—it 
may be persuasively argued that some other authority ought to review accu-
sations of malfeasance relating to the self-same measures.  
Outside Israel, the sharp edge of the argument is largely blunted. When 
legal advisers act in a purely consultative capacity, there is no reason for ex-
cessive misgivings about the potential role of the head of the relevant JAG 
(Judge Advocate General) Corps in any post-op inquiry into decisions taken 
by a military commander.  
 




It goes without saying that the presence of legal advisers offering counsel to 
military commanders in the field cannot by itself safeguard observance of 
LOAC. A modicum of familiarity of the military commanders with the basic 
 
41. Id. ¶ 32. 
42. On the legal mechanisms for investigating complaints against IDF conduct, see The 











legal norms regulating the conduct of hostilities is an essential precondition 
for the effective implementation of LOAC.43  
In accordance with Article 83 of AP/I, Contracting Parties undertake (in 
paragraph 1) to disseminate the Geneva Conventions and AP/I as widely as 
possible—in particular, by including their study in programs of military in-
struction—and, more significantly for the purposes of this essay, paragraph 
2 prescribes: “Any military or civilian authorities who, in time of armed con-
flict, assume responsibilities in respect of the application of the Conventions 
and this Protocol shall be fully acquainted with the text thereof.”44 
The general obligation incumbent on States to disseminate LOAC as 
widely as possible to their armed forces is accentuated already in all four 1949 
Geneva Conventions for the protection of war victims,45 as well as in the 
1954 Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property,46 and in the 1980 
Convention on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons.47 Indubitably, 
this is customary international law today.48  
 
B. Orders and Instructions  
  
Article 1 of Hague Conventions (II) and (IV) of 1899 and 1907, with respect 
to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, imposes an obligation on States 
to issue instructions to their armed forces in conformity with the Regulations 
 
43. See Knut Dörmann, Dissemination and Monitoring Compliance of International Humanitar-
ian Law, in INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW FACING NEW CHALLENGES 227, 228 
(Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg & Volker Epping eds., 2007). 
44. AP/I, supra note 1, art. 83(2), at 41.  
45. Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in 
Armed Forces in the Field art. 47, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31, 62 [here-
inafter Geneva Convention (I)]; Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of 
Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea art. 48, Aug. 12, 1949, 
6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85, 114 [hereinafter Geneva Convention (II)]; Convention (III) 
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 127, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 
U.N.T.S. 135, 236; Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time 
of War art. 144, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, 386. 
46. Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict 
art. 25, May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 240, 258–60 [hereinafter 1954 Hague Convention]. 
47. Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional 
Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate 
Effects art. 6, Oct. 10, 1980, 1342 U.N.T.S. 137, 165 [hereinafter CCW]. 











annexed to the instrument.49 The idea goes back to the 1864 Geneva Con-
vention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in 
the Field.50 It has progressed to Article 45 of Geneva Convention (I) and 
Article 46 of Geneva Convention (II) of 1949, which stipulate that each party 
to the conflict—through its commanders-in-chief—shall ensure the detailed 
execution of the respective instrument and even provide for unforeseen cir-
cumstances (consonant with the general principles of the Conventions).51  
The Geneva texts from 1864 to 1949 use the term “Commanders-in-
Chief” in the plural, thereby indicating that the enunciated obligation is not 
limited to the supreme level of authority but extends to military command 
in a more general sense.52 Article 87(2) of AP/I ordains that, “commensurate 
with their level of responsibility,” commanders are required to ensure that 
their subordinates are aware of their obligations under the Geneva Conven-
tions and AP/I.53 
The ultimate responsibility in the domain of LOAC devolves on the 
States concerned. Article 80(2) of AP/I lays down: “The High Contracting 
Parties and the Parties to the conflict shall give orders and instructions to 
ensure the observance of the Conventions and this Protocol, and shall su-
pervise their execution.”54 In a sense, orders and instructions are meant to 
“translate” LOAC for ready use by the armed forces.55 
Supervision of execution of orders and instructions has several dimen-
sions, the most self-evident being the imposition of discipline in the armed 
forces to enforce LOAC observance. But supervision also connotes the im-
plantation of LOAC into military doctrine. This can be done in multifarious 
ways. A leading technique is the promulgation of national military manuals, 
 
49. Convention No. II with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 1, 
July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803, T.S. No. 403; Convention No. IV Respecting the Laws and 
Customs of War on Land art. 1, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2227, T.S. No. 539. 
50. Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in 
the Field, Aug. 22, 1864, 22 Stat. 940, 129 Consol. T.S. 361. See also THE LAWS OF ARMED 
CONFLICTS, supra note 3, at 365, 367 (Article 8). 
51. Geneva Convention (I), supra note 45, art. 45, at 61; Geneva Convention (II), supra 
note 45, art. 46, at 114. 
52. See INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE 
FIRST GENEVA CONVENTION: CONVENTION (I) FOR THE AMELIORATION OF THE CONDI-
TION OF THE WOUNDED AND SICK IN THE ARMED FORCES IN THE FIELD ¶¶ 2710–13, at 
965–66 (2016). 
53. AP/I, supra note 1, art. 87(2), at 43. 
54. Id., art. 80(2), at 40. 












such as the aforementioned US Department of Defense Law of War Manual 
(bolstered by complementary Commander’s Handbooks released by the Army 
and Marines,56 as well as by the Navy, Marines, and Coast Guard57). Other 
mechanisms for inculcating LOAC norms in the armed forces are also in use 
(telling examples are the Air Force’s The Law of Air, Space, and Cyber Opera-
tions58 and the Army’s Law of Armed Conflict Deskbook59). 
 
C. Training in General 
 
It is not enough for States to enact orders and instructions or to produce 
manuals and handbooks. It is indispensable to provide all tiers of the armed 
forces with proper LOAC training. Legal advisers under Article 82 of AP/I 
are required to offer counsel to military commanders not only on the appli-
cation of LOAC but also on “the appropriate instruction to be given the 
armed forces on this subject.”  
Appropriate instruction in LOAC must commence in peacetime. While 
it is mandatory to train every soldier, sailor, and aviator in fundamental 
norms of LOAC, attention must be given to the specialized positions held 
and functions performed in the military hierarchy.60 Senior commanders can-
not be treated equally with junior (or non-commissioned) officers: the higher 
the rank of commanders, the better acquainted with LOAC they should be. 
Military academies for graduating officers can therefore stick to fairly intro-
ductory courses, whereas staff and war colleges should focus on a more ad-
vanced syllabus. Obviously, the main thrust of all training has to be attuned 
to the priorities of the specific Service (with correlative emphasis on land, 
naval, or air warfare, as the case may be).  
 
56. HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES 
MARINE CORPS, FM 6-27/MCTP 11-10C, THE COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW 
OF LAND WARFARE (2019) (superseding an earlier version of 1956). 
57. U.S. NAVY, MARINE CORPS & COAST GUARD, NWP 1-14M/MCTP 11-
10B/COMDTPUB P5800.7A, THE COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL 
OPERATIONS (2017) (superseding an earlier version of 2007). 
58. JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL & COMMANDANT, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GEN-
ERAL’S SCHOOL, U.S. AIR FORCE, THE LAW OF AIR, SPACE, AND CYBER OPERATIONS (4th 
ed. 2020). 
59. NATIONAL SECURITY LAW DEPARTMENT, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S LE-
GAL CENTER & SCHOOL, U.S. ARMY, LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT DESKBOOK (2020). 
60. See Elzbieta Mikos-Skuza, Dissemination of the Conventions, including in Time of Armed 
Conflict, in THE 1949 GENEVA CONVENTIONS: A COMMENTARY 597, 604 (Andrew Clapham 











Considering that a study of LOAC is only one component in the training 
curriculum of officers of whatever rank, a greater exposure of senior com-
manders to LOAC does not signify that they are likely to acquire more than 
sketchy legal proficiency. It is consequently important to verify that com-
manders absorb the core rules of LOAC falling within their actual remit.61 
Bearing in mind that commanders may not be fully conversant with the rel-
evant LOAC strictures, legal advisers are called upon to assist them in weigh-
ing military versus legal constraints. 
 
D. Training of Legal Advisers 
 
The “unstated but necessary corollary” of the general training requisite is 
that legal advisers themselves must get their share of the “appropriate in-
struction.”62 The average graduate of law school is rarely adept at the intri-
cacies of LOAC. That being the case, the necessary training of armed forces 
must begin with in-depth and well-rounded63 preparation of legal advisers 
for their missions in the field. 
Training a typical attorney to become a legal adviser with LOAC adroit-
ness is not just a matter of polishing some edges. The sheer size of the ma-
terials to be perused speaks for itself. For instance, the US Department of 
Defense Law of War Manual runs into almost 1,200 pages and each of the 
complementary Service handbooks is comprised of hundreds of additional 
pages.64 Besides, LOAC training cannot be confined to memorizing manuals 
and studying general orders. There is no way for wide-spectrum texts to 
come to grips with every concrete challenge engendered by combat contin-
gencies. When the chips are down, legal advisers should be trained to cope 
not only with conventional scenarios but also with unforeseen circumstances 
(cf. Geneva Article 45/46).  
 
61. See 1 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra note 5, at 502. 
62. Michael A. Newton, Modern Military Necessity: The Role & Relevance of Military Lawyers, 
12 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 877, 890 (2007). 
63. By way of illustration, legal advisers “need to be thoroughly trained in the protection 
of cultural property” in light of the provision of Article 25 of the 1954 Hague Convention. 
1954 Hague Convention, supra note 46, art. 25, at 258–60. JIRI TOMAN, THE PROTECTION 
OF CULTURAL PROPERTY IN THE EVENT OF ARMED CONFLICT 276 (1996). 
64. The 1995 version of the U.S. COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL 
OPERATIONS (see supra note 57) even had an elaborate Annotated Supplement, published as 73 











The United States has established an outstanding Army JAG School,65 
with parallel Naval and Air Force JAG Schools in operation. Yet, not every 
country enjoys the luxury of such expensive educational facilities. If national 
training resources are limited, States can obtain external sustenance from 
various foreign sources.66 It is also possible to profit from training opportu-
nities available in international centers like the San Remo Institute of Inter-
national Humanitarian Law, which for many years has provided LOAC 
courses (in several languages) for both lawyers and operational officers from 
across the globe.67 
 
V. ACCOUNTABILITY FOR WAR CRIMES 
 
A. Military Commanders and War Crimes 
 
We live in an era of constant upsurge in public pressure for exposing the 
military community to the ordeal of war crimes trials. After decades during 
which the international community declined to hold such trials,68 a new zeit-
geist has evolved, culminating in the establishment in 1998 of the Interna-
tional Criminal Court (starting to function in 2002). Even in countries like 
the United States that have not accepted the jurisdiction of the Court, there 
is a growing demand that members of the armed forces will be subjected to 
the full brunt of the domestic penal code if and when they perpetrate serious 
breaches of LOAC. 
The person who is especially in the limelight of any war crimes investi-
gation is patently the military commander. When the record is examined, any 
LOAC admonition by a legal adviser against pursuing a questionable course 
of action during combat acquires special significance by hindsight. A military 
commander who ignores professional remonstrance in flagrante should not 
be surprised by the ensuing criminal consequences. Indeed, if war crimes 
 
65. On the JAG School, see Richard P. DiMeglio, Training Army Judge Advocates to Advise 
Commanders as Operational Law Attorneys, 54 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW 1185, 1192–95 
(2013). 
66. See Laurie R. Blank & Gregory P. Noone, LAW OF WAR TRAINING: RESOURCES 
FOR MILITARY AND CIVILIAN LEADERS 6–7 (2d ed. 2013). 
67. For the origins of the San Remo military courses, see Giorgio Blais, The International 
Institute of Humanitarian Law (San Remo) and Its International Military Courses on the Law of Armed 
Conflict, 37 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 451 (1997). 
68. The failure of the international community for half a century to punish war crimi-
nals was underscored by Howard S. Levie, War Crimes, 72 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 











charges lead to a verdict of conviction, a military commander’s refusal to 
follow professional legal advice will inescapably be considered an aggravating 
circumstance affecting the sentence to be determined. 
 
B. Legal Advisers Giving Erroneous Counsel 
 
There is a natural tendency to envisage every legal adviser as a metaphorical 
brake, applying pressure on the military commander to desist from conduct 
that might clash with LOAC. But legal advisers are not infallible and they are 
liable to give a go-ahead signal to acts branded as war crimes in later judicial 
proceedings.  
To analyze the subject in its most rudimentary form, it may be useful to 
explore the paradigmatic scenario in which a military command is engaged 
in comprising a list (or “bank”) of potential targets for attack by military 
aircraft, missiles, artillery, or otherwise. The targets’ selection must be based 
on the LOAC cardinal principle of distinction between military objectives 
and civilian objects.69 When looked at from the angle of penal accountability, 
the pivotal text is Article 8(2)(b)(ii) of the 1998 Rome Statute of the Interna-
tional Criminal Court defining as a war crime the act of “[i]ntentionally di-
recting attacks against civilian objects, that is, objects which are not military 
objectives.”70  
Targeting is a multifaceted operation that includes taking of precautions 
and minimizing collateral damage to innocent civilians.71 But the quintessen-
tial first step is to identify military objectives (i.e., lawful targets for attack), 
in contradistinction to civilian objects. Under Article 52(2) of AP/I, “military 
objectives are limited to those objects which by their nature, location, pur-
pose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total 
or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling 
at the time, offers a definite military advantage.”72 The United States has 
expressly accepted this definition of military objectives,73 which is shored up 
 
69. On the cardinal principle of distinction, see Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear 
Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, ¶ 78 (July 8). 
70. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 8(2)(b)(ii), July 17, 1998, 2187 
U.N.T.S. 90, 95. 
71. On the whole process of targeting, see Geoffrey S. Corn, Targeting, Command Judg-
ment, and a Proposed Quantum of Information Component, 77 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW 437, 444–
50 (2012).  
72. AP/I, supra note 1, art. 52(2), at 27. 











by other treaty texts.74 The definition has been held by the Eritrea-Ethiopia 
Claims Commission to reflect customary international law.75 
Although buttressed by consensus, the abstract terminology of Article 
52(2) does not really enlighten military commanders faced with practical di-
lemmas in concrete battle situations.76 Commanders are often baffled by the 
question whether a particular object (say, a TV broadcasting installation77) 
qualifies as a military objective by nature or a given area outside the combat 
zone is classified as a military objective by location.78 Not to mention the 
broader quandary whether “war-sustaining” (at variance from “war-
fighting”) can constitute military objectives.79 If legal advisers are at hand, 
military commanders will presumably be eager to consult them on the reso-
lution of these and similar perplexities. Interestingly, the German Com-
mander’s Handbook states categorically that “[l]egal advisers are to be involved 
in the process of targeting.”80 
It is only natural to assume that—when consulted—legal advisers would 
do whatever they can to steer military commanders away from proscribed 
conduct.81 But the Winograd Commission should be complimented for put-
ting its finger on the plight of a military commander whose legal adviser 
makes a wrong call by approving certain acts that are regarded by third par-
ties as a war crime.82 The issue was raised by the Commission in the singular 
 
74. See Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and 
Other Devices art. 2(4), Oct. 10, 1980, 1342 U.N.T.S. 168, 168; Protocol on Prohibitions or 
Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons art. 1(3), Oct. 10, 1980, 1342 U.N.T.S. 171, 
172. 
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Claims 1, 3, 5, 9–13, 14, 21, 25 & 26 (Eri. v. Eth.), 26 R.I.I.A. 291, 332 (Eri.–Eth. Claims 
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76. See YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF IN-
TERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 103–4 (3d ed. 2016). 
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normative landscape of Israel. However, the peril of legal advisers proffering 
possibly faulty counsel to military commanders is fraught in every country. 
Clearly, the fact that a military commander has been assured by a legal 
adviser that a specific object passes muster as a military objective cannot be 
regarded as conclusive. An eventual judicial probe may infer from the same 
set of circumstances that (contrary to the legal adviser’s opinion) the object 
was truly civilian in character. Would the military commander and/or the 
legal adviser then be exposed to war crimes prosecution by virtue of Article 
8(2)(b)(ii) of the Rome Statute? 
 
C. Legal Advisers and Complicity 
  
The war crime defined in Article 8(2)(b)(ii) is couched in terms of “[i]nten-
tionally directing attacks against civilian objects.” Evidently, the direction of 
attacks must be ascribed exclusively to the military commander, who—if cul-
pable of the war crime—would be convicted as the principal actor. However, 
if the legal adviser dismisses doubts about the military status of an object 
against which an attack is to be directed, would it not be possible to charge 
him/her as an accomplice to the war crime? Aiding, abetting, and otherwise 
assisting in the commission of a crime are grounds of individual responsibil-
ity in keeping with Article 25(3)(c) of the Rome Statute.83 Aiding or abetting 
may consist of encouragement or lending moral support to the perpetration 
of a war crime.84 
Judges and prosecutors, acting as accessories abetting criminal activities, 
can be found guilty of war crimes: this has been judicially confirmed in the 
setting of the acts of barbarism perpetrated under the Nazi regime.85 No 
actual case law exists stigmatizing legal advisers in the field as accomplices in 
criminal activity. Yet, it would be hard to refute the proposition that in prin-
ciple they can be deemed complicit in the commission of war crimes.86  
 
 
83. Rome Statute, supra note 70, art. 25(3)(c), at 105. 
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D. Military Commanders and Mistake of Law 
 
There is a corollary to the conundrum of complicity in war crimes by legal 
advisers. That is the query whether—by consulting with a legal adviser and 
getting a green light for directing an attack against a preselected object—a 
military commander might be relieved of individual accountability for a war 
crime under Article 8(2)(b)(ii). It must not be forgotten that the direction of 
attacks against civilian objects constitutes a war crime only if it is done 
“[i]ntentionally.” Pursuant to Article 30 of the Rome Statute and unless oth-
erwise provided, an overall requirement of a mental element of “knowledge 
and intent” is postulated as a condition of criminal responsibility.87 
Knowledge “means awareness that a circumstance exists or a consequence 
will occur in the ordinary course of events,” and intent denotes that a person 
means to cause a certain consequence.88 Can it be averred that a military 
commander, who has been assured by a legal adviser that a concrete object 
constitutes a military objective, acted with knowledge and intent to direct an 
attack against a civilian object? 
The present author believes that it would be exceedingly difficult (if not 
impossible) to hold a military commander guilty of a war crime in such a 
frame of reference, assuming that the action was carried out bona fide and 
the legal advice was not manifestly wrong. The rationale for absolving the 
military commander is that, notwithstanding the existence of an actus reus, 
there would be no mens rea. By relying on legal advice, tendered by an expert 
formally deployed to serve in the command post in compliance with LOAC, 
a military commander may be deemed to have done all that he/she was rea-
sonably expected and required to do.  
An attempt has been made to distinguish between a military commander 
requesting legal assistance and one receiving unsolicited advice: “A com-
mander cannot be exempted from liability for having relied on wrong advice 
from his legal advisor. Yet, the fact that he asked for advice keeps the possi-
bility of resort to the defence of mistake of law open.”89  
The active/passive distinction has its attractions. But, once the military 
commander abides by legal advice offered by a person earmarked for that 
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purpose congruent with LOAC, it seems immaterial how the advice perco-
lated. The gravamen of the military commander’s predicament is that the 
action was prompted by spurious professional guidance. 
The subject-matter under discussion ties in with the provision of Article 
32(2) of the Rome Statute, according to which a “mistake of law” may ex-
ceptionally be “a ground for excluding criminal responsibility if it negates the 
mental element required by such a crime.”90 Arguendo, a misleading legal 
advice validating action by the military commander would negate the mental 
element required by the war crime defined in Article 8(2)(b)(ii).  
An authoritative solution to the problem must await elucidation by the 
International Criminal Court. Most scholars have skirted the issue, and few 
insights can be elicited from the legal literature. It has been commented that 
“the conditions under which a military commander can use a wrong legal 
advice as defence are, in any case, narrow.”91 But, narrow as these conditions 
may be, there is a compelling need to recognize that—in the final analysis—
specious legal advice may exonerate military commanders from criminal re-
sponsibility.92 
   
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
 
There can be little doubt that the participation of legal advisers in the delib-
erative functioning of military headquarters during armed conflict is of vital 
importance. The mere attendance of legal advisers in staff meetings intro-
duces into the operational agenda the imperative need to pay due regard to 
the law.93 With legal advisers present, it is difficult for military commanders 
to plead ignorance or oversight of LOAC.94 If a legal adviser gains trust and 
credibility, numerous prospective breaches of LOAC can be screened and 
forestalled thanks to timely intervention. 
The Winograd Commission to the contrary notwithstanding, the practice 
of assigning legal advisers to military commands—contrived to ensure that 
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decision-makers will be able to gain access to professional LOAC counsel in 
real time—is here to stay. Like the dissemination of LOAC to the armed 
forces, the issuance of proper general orders, and the sponsoring of training 
courses (adjusted to rank and function), the availability of legal advisers to 
military commanders is an immensely useful tool. All the same, it must be 
conceded that this is not by itself a panacea. 
No device designed to foster implementation of LOAC can be fail-safe. 
The integration of legal advisers into the battle environment does not rule 
out bad judgment calls leading to the espousal of wrongful actions. Such 
miscues can spawn individual criminal responsibility of legal advisers, while 
possibly exculpating military commanders. These are theoretical issues that 
have not yet been scrutinized in practice. Still, inevitably, they are bound to 
come to the surface (in as yet unknown forms) in future armed conflicts. 
